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Summary. The quest for finding the right interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
(QM) is as old als QM and still has not ended, and may never end. The question
what an interpretation of QM is has hardly ever been raised explicitly, let alone an-
swered. We raise it and answer it. Then the quest for the right interpretation can
continue self-consciously, for we then know exactly what we are after. We present a
list of minimal requirements that something has to meet in order to qualify as an
interpretation of QM. We also raise, as a side issue, the question how the discourse
on the interpretation of QM relates to hermeneutics in Continental Philosophy.
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1 Nuemaid Motts and a Nichtian Glossary
James Augustine Aloysius Joyce (1882–1941) constructed this tantaltuous and tumulis-
ing towertome Finnegans Wake (1939) in the period during which quantum mechanics
was created (1923–1939), by Werner Heisenberg, Max Born, Pascual Jordan, Wolfgang
Pauli, P.A.M. Dirac and Erwin Schro¨dinger, was axiomatised, by Johnny vonNeumann,
was applied, by numerous physicists, was interpreted, by Niels Bohr and Heisenberg,
was demonstrated to exclude certain alternative theories, by VonNeumann, and was crit-
icised, by Albert Einstein, Schro¨dinger and others. Over the past decades, philosophers
have joined the interpretation effort — with remarkable success, we dare add.
News broadcast in Finnegans Wake:2
The abnihilization of the etym by the grisning of the grosning of the grinder of the grunder
by the first lord of Hurteford expolodonates through Parsuralia with an ivanmorinthorro-
rumble fragoromboassity amidwhiches general uttermost confusion are perceivable mole-
tons scaping with mulicules . . . Similar scenatas are projectilised from Hullulullu, Bawl-
awayo, empyreal Raum and mordern Atems.
Recall that in 1911 Lord Rutherford (lord of Hurteford) split the atom (etym), a detona-
tion of sorts where electrons (moletons) and molecules (mulicules) escape, projectiles
moving through empirical space (German Raum). The historical event was reported all
around the globe, like in Paris (Hullulullu), Rome (Bawlawayo) and Athens (Atems).
Traces of both the Quantum and the Relativity Revolution in physics are scattered
all over Finnegans Wake.
Philosophically, Finnegans Wake can be seen to raise the issue of what meaning is,
even of language is. We let this grand issue sleep.
To interpret a word, an expression, a sentence, a text, is to assign meaning to it.
Clear and unambiguous kinds of texts, such as the telephone directory of Hullulullu,
the weather forecast for tomorrow in Bawlawayo, the papers of Patrick Colonel Sup-
pes, and the user manual of your brand new ten-dimensional retina-screen nanowave
stringphone, do not stand in need of interpretation. Other kinds of text cry out ear-
splittingly for interpretation, of which Finnegans Wake arguably is the most clear and
unambiguous instance ever created. Quantum mechanics is somewhere in between.
As Dummett (1925–2011) testified:3
Physicists know how to use quantum mechanics and, impressed by its success, think it is
true; but their endless debates about the interpretation of quantum mechanics show that
they do not know what it means.
But standing in need of interpretation is something that Finnegans Wake and quan-
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tum mechanics (QM) share with lots of other texts. We must take a closer look to un-
derstand why they are special.
Joyce judged natural-language-as-we-know-it (whenceforth: Nalasweknowit) inade-
quate to describe what happens in the dreamworld, and created, for this very purpose,
a ‘new language’, if that is the appropriate phrase: “nuemaid motts truly plural and
plusible” (138.08–09) and a “nichtian glossery which purveys aprioric roots for aposte-
riorious tongues this is nat language in any sinse of the world” (83.10–11). Heisenberg
and Bohr judged Nalasweknowit, of which they considered ‘the language of classi-
cal physics’ a refinement, inadequate to describe what happens in the microphysical
world, the world of very small physical entities and very brief physical processes.
Small wonder. Nalasweknowit has developed while homo sapiens and its ancestry
waswide awake, i.e. not dreaming, and interactingwith themacrophysical world filled
with trees, rocks and animals, andwith days, seasons and lifetimes. Manwas occupied
with fulfilling his biological needs of nutrition, protection and procreation, rather than
with penetrating the ephemerally flashing realm of dreams, explaining the phenomena
by means of theories, or unravelling the mysteries of a realm of reality inaccessible by
the unaided senses. No one had ever wanted or needed to go above and beyond the
waking macrophysical world, or to transcend our biological needs, which we shared
with the beasts. But, at some day, the time had come that we did want and did need to
go precisely there, and we did want transcend our beasty needs. On Earth, how?
Back to the early 20th Century. Understanding the microphysical world was no
longer deemed possible with Nalasweknowit. In order to grasp this realm of reality
somehow, only a ‘symbolic description’, or aDeutung, by abstract mathematical means
seemed possible. Of course nothing remotely like “multimathematical immateriali-
ties” (394.31–32) was the means for Joyce to penetrate the realm of dreams. Joyce
constructed numerous neologisms and portmanteaux: “the dialytically separated ele-
ments of precedent decomposition for the verypetpurpose of subsequent recombina-
tion” (614.34–35). In contradistinction to how Joyce accomplished his daunting task
of evoking the phantasmagorical events of deep weep sleep, i.e. by creating Finnegans
Wake, and thereby replacing Nalasweknowit, what the founding fathers of QM did was
far less radical: a comparatively small yet significant enrichment of Nalasweknowit
would initially turn out to be sufficient to unlock the secrets of the atom — but would
eventually also lead to perplexities the world of science had never seen before . . .
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2 Abnihilazation and Everintermutuoemergent
No matter how one characterises QM pecisely, e.g. as the deductive closure of a set of
sentences (the postulates) in a formal language or through a class of models (structures
in the domain of discourse of axiomatic set-theory), or some sophisticated combina-
tion of these, QM incontestably has propositional content, expressed in declarative sen-
tences of Nalasweknowit, enriched with physical and mathematical vocabulary and
with symbols. QM makes a large variety of pronouncements about physical reality,
measurements included, that can be and have been tested severely. Sometimes QM
says things that raise our eyebrows sky high, like there be non-local correlations that
do not fall off with distance and cannot be explained even by an appeal to the entire past
of the carriers of the correlata (version of Bell’s Theorem), and like a continuously ob-
served kettle filled with water on the fire that never boils (quantum Zeno paradox).4
Sometimes QM remains mute when we desperately crave for answers, like when we
ask whether Schro¨dinger’s unmeasured, and therefore unobserved cat is dead or alive,
since QM does neither fulfil the truth-condition for the sentence ‘The unobserved cat is
alive’, nor for ‘The unobserved cat is dead’, QM falls silent. Needless to add that the
celebrated case of Schro¨dinger’s cat extrapolates to the entire unmeasured part of the
universe, which comprises nearly everything. We observe a few drops of the ocean of
being. Nearly all of physical reality is ontically indeterminate, and therefore is not really
reality at all . . . QM forbids us to speak whereof we want to speak.
Notice that a use theory of meaning, which takes the use of words, expressions
and sentences constitutive for their meaning, does not sit comfortably either with
Dummett’s locution displayed above: if, first, knowing the meaning of QM resides
in knowing how to use it, and, secondly, granted that physicists know how to use QM
in every which way, that is, knowing how to construct quantum-mechanical models of
phenomena, knowing how to reason quantum-mechanically, knowing how to calcu-
late measurement outcomes, knowing how analyse experiments using QM then they
should know its meaning, whereas the endless debates about the interpretation of QM
—which we shall provisionally call its hermeneutic predicament— is taken to show the
contrary, namely that they do not know what QMmeans.
If the project to interpret QM is, in good hermeneutic fashion, to assign meaning to
it, we must ask which expressions of QM stand in need of interpretation, because, then,
apparently theirmeaning is not obvious, or is ambiguous, or is obscure, or in any way
stand in dire need of receiving clear and unambiguous meaning. If every expression
in QM were perfectly clear, there would obviously be no need to interpret QM.
The vocabulary of QM is rather mathematical and its mathematical concepts are
crystal clear. They do not stand in need of interpretation — Hilbert-space, self-adjoint
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operator, eigenvalue equation, unitary evolution, statistical operator, Clebsch-Gordan
coefficients, Weyl rays, unitary representations of a symmetry group, permutation op-
erators, Wigner distributions, and what have you. The physical vocabulary, includ-
ing physical magnitude, physical system, composite system and subsystem, physical
property and physical relation also seem far from obscure. This is not to say that these
concepts are beyond interpretation, let alone beyond metaphysical disputation. Con-
cepts of QM that stand in need of interpretation are the physical state of a physical
system and the probability for finding specific outcomes upon measurement, and cer-
tainly the concept of measurement itself. On the one hand, one can send everybody
who raises questions about measurement to a laboratory: observe what is happening
there and ask around; if that will not do, then nothing will. On the other hand, when
we ask what a measurement is, we are after a general answer, a general concept of
measurement, one that encompasses what happens inside all laboratories; everything
we want to call a measurement should be an instance of our general concept, and ev-
erything we do not want to call a measurement should not be an instance of it. This
general concept should cover our use of the word ‘measurement’, but need not cover it
entirely, for we shall gladly pay the price of lack of full coverage for a clear general con-
cept. In short, we are after a Carnapian explication of the concept of measurement. By
way of an interjection, we shall have a go at this in the next Section. When a physical
system qualifies as piece of measurement apparatus, when a physical interaction qual-
ifies as a measurement interaction, when an event qualifies as a measurement event,
and perhaps more, have been issues for analysis and controversy since the advent of
QM. Certainly we want to count these issues part and parcel of discourse ‘the interpre-
tation of QM’.
Probability is mathematically represented by a normed additive mapping from some
Boolean subset family of R, say the intervals I(R), to the interval [0, 1] ⊂ R:
Pr : I(R) → R . (1)
So for the mathematician, this is all there is to probability: a normed measure on I(R).
Not for the scientist, who has to relate the normedmeasure to theworld. The quantum-
mechanic has to relate probability at the very least to measurement outcomes. The only
way to do this is via relative frequencies. But whether probability is a limiting relative
frequency amounts to taking a further philosophical step, as does identifying proba-
bility with objective change, as does identifying it with propensity, i.e. some generalised
quantitative disposition, and as does taking it as a degree of subjective belief or a degree
of rational credence. We entered the field of interpreting probability. Some hold that
quantum probability is somehow special and different from probability as it occurs else-
where in physics and in science generally. The discussion of whether this is true, and
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how quantum probability then differs from probability applied elsewhere is however
not a central theme in the interpretation of QM — at best it is a peripheral theme.
Like the concept of probability, the concept of physical state is primitive, yet unlike
probability, it can be and is represented mathematically in many distinct ways: as a
⊛ a normed Hilbert-vector, or
⊛ a Weyl-ray, or
⊛ a statistical operator acting on a Hilbert-space, or
⊛ a positive map on a C∗-algebra.
Maybe calling a Hilbert-vector (or Weyl-ray, or . . .) the mathematical representative of
the physical state of a physical system is a mistake: a Hilbert-vector should remain a
physically uninterpreted and purely mathematical concept in QM, an auxiliary device
to calculate probability distributions of measurement outcomes. There is no ‘physical
state’ of the unmeasured cat in purgatory: we are led to believe that the cat has, or
is in, a physical state by mistakenly trying to attribute physical meaning to a Hilbert-
vector that is a superposition of two vectors, which according to the standard property
postulate we associate with a cat having the property of being dead and one having the
property of being alive, respectively. We believe the unmeasured cat is some particular
physical state but perhaps it isn’t. QM associates a Hilbert-vector to the cat, which is
devoid of physical meaning, but enables the computation of probability measures over
measurement-outcomes, which are full of physical meaning. Thus we have physical
meaningfulness out of physical meaninglessness. Sheer magic. Magic does however
not help us to understand physical reality.
The wilful jump to meaninglessness seems however a cheap way out. I don’t like
it. We believe that the unmeasured cat is either stone dead or breathing, because ter-
tium non possibilium, and we want QM to be logically compatible with this belief, at the
very least, and preferrably to imply one or the other belief. After all, QM also predicts
that as soon as we peek at (i.e. measure) the cat, through a pinhole, unbeknownst to
the cat, it is either dead or alive. Rather than to withhold physical significance from
the Hilbert-vector, we should try to assign physical significance to it (or to a Weyl-ray,
or . . .). For how else could it determine physically meaningful probability measures
over measurement-outcomes? No physical significance in, but physical significance
out? That ought to be unacceptable. One way is to connect Hilbert-vectors to equiva-
lence classes of preparation procedures in the laboratory. This won’t help us however
with Schro¨dinger’s unmeasured cat. This won’t help us with anything, because su-
perpositions are the rule, not the exception. The founding fathers of QM started with
electrons in superpositions, soon other elementary particles followed, then atoms, and
nowadays we have bucky-ball molecules and circulating currents in superconducting
5
metals in superpositions in the laboratory. The march of superpositions from the realm
of the tiny to the realm of medium-sized dry objects is not halting.
So-called modal interpretations of QM have taught us that the cat ceases to be a prob-
lem as soon as we reject ‘half’ of what we shall call the Standard Property Postulate of
QM, which one can find the classic texts of VonNeumann [1932] and Dirac [1928] —
and which remains nearly always tacit in textbooks on QM.5
 Standard Property Postulate (Dirac, Von Neumann). A physical system S having
physical state |ψ〉 ∈ H has quantitative physical property mathematically represented by
the ordered pair 〈B, b〉, where B is an operator representing some physical magnitude and
where b ∈ R, iff |ψ〉 is an eigenstate of B having eigenvalue b: B|ψ〉 = b|ψ〉.
When it is no longer necessary for the state to be an eigenstate of B in order for
physical system S to have a property of the sort 〈B, b〉, then the unmeasured cat can be
either dead or alive even when its state is not a corresponding eigenstate — but is a su-
perposition of such eigenstates. The compatibility between QM and our belief that the
unmeasured cat is either dead or alive is saved. What can be adhered to, then, is not
the Standard Property Postulate but the  Sufficiency Property Postulate, according
to which it is sufficient (but not necessary) for the system to be in some eigenstate of
B in order to possess property 〈B, b〉 (one drops one conjunct of the Standard Property
Postulate).
Logically weakening a postulate seems however to have little to do with interpreta-
tion in the hermeneutic sense of assigning meaning to expressions whose meaning is
unclear, ambiguous or obscure. Indeed, for modal interpreters of QM, the problem of
interpretation is to find the right conditions for property ascriptions — in addition to the
stingy Sufficiency Property Postulate —, rather than to dwell on the meaning of ‘phy-
sical state’ (or Weyl-ray, or . . .). (We say ‘stingy’, because a physical system is almost
never in an eigenstate, so one can almost never invoke the Sufficiency Property Pos-
tulate.) This points away from hermeneutical activity when considering interpreting
QM to changing the postulates — unless one subscribes to a theory of meaning such
that changing the conditions for the ascription of properties changes the meaning of
the word ‘property’, in which case one should consider such property postulates as
Carnapian meaning postulates, rather than synthetic postulates that are made true (or
false) by the way the world is.
It is in order to mention the exception of Oxonian Everettians, who under the lead
of S.W. Saunders tinker with the meaning of ‘existence’ and tensed expressions by rela-
tivising them to a ‘perspective’, a ‘branch’, and who, like all Everettians, assign special
significance to the terms of the state vector when expanded in a special basis, which
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is selected by the physical proces of decoherence.6 They re-interpret and therefore
change the meaning of words in Nalasweknowit. Hermeneutics in action. One could
also maintain that the problem of interpreting QM just is the problem of finding an in-
telligible physical meaning to attribute to the mathematical concept of a Hilbert-vector
(or . . .) in such a way that our belief that the unmeasured cat is either dead or alive sur-
vives whilst leaving the VonNeumann postulates of QM untouched in all their glory,
save perhaps minor modifications. But then modal interpreters of QM are not interpret-
ing QM. There is no hermeneutic activity going on. What, then, are they doing?
They are changing the theory of QM by changing (one of) its postulates, which
results in a different theory of QM, just like changing the parallel axiom of Euclidean
Geometry results in a different geometrical theory. When that different geometrical
theory, if true, tells us that the structure of space is different from what Euclidean
Geometry tells us, then mutatis mutandis modal QM provides a different description
of the microphysical world than standard QM does. This is the key insight of this pa-
per and the essence of our alternative view of what it means to interpret QM. But before
we turn to that, first the promised interjection on measurement.
3 Multimathematical Murkblankered Immaterialities
3.1 Preambule
In English, as in most languages, to measure is a verb. The noun ‘measurement’ is de-
rived from it: to measure is to perform a measurement, and to perform a measurement
is to measure. To measure is a manifestation of intentional behaviour, i.e. it is a type
of action, performed by a human being, with a purpose — or by any being having the
cognitive capacities to exhibit it. Therefore the concept of measurement is an intentional
concept.
The concept of measurement is expressed most explicitly, we submit, by a pentatic
predicate: someone (p) measures something (A) that pertains to something (S) using some-
thing else (M) and obtains result a:
Measure(p, A, S, M, a) : pmeasures A of S by means ofM and obtains a. (2)
There are kinds of measurements, whose extensions are subclasses of the extension
of (2): demolishion measurements, ideal measurements, extensive measurements, per-
fect measurements, sharpmeasurements, weakmeasurements, . . . Thewordmeasurement
occurs in combinations with other words, especially in science; these combinations ex-
press different but allied concepts, which we call measurement concepts: measurement
event, measurement process, measurement procedure, measurement result, outcome,
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measurement interaction, measurement apparatus, measurement theory, measurabil-
ity. In every case, the suffix ‘measurement’ points to a kind: measurement events are a
kind of events, they form a subclass of the class of all events; measurement processes
are a kind of processes, they form a subclass of the class of all processes; etc. The pur-
pose of this Section is to analyse the concept of measurement (2) and other measure-
ment concepts, but only those in so far needed in the core concept Meas (2). The other
measurement concepts will have to wait.
In our analysandum, the concept of Measurement (2), five things are connected: hu-
man being p, value a, entity S, entity M, and magnitude A. The challenge is to charac-
terise these concepts in a way that does not rely on the concept of measurement or any
of the allied concepts, otherwise we awaken the spectre of circularity. We gloss over
the concept of a human being and move now to the other concepts from the putative
analysans, one per Subsection.
3.2 Values
Value a is a number. Number a is a rational number (a ∈ Q), because every mea-
surement has a finite accuracy. Since two measurement results, a and b, can be taken
as the real and the imaginary part of a complex number, there is room for extending
Q to Crat ⊂ C, the set of complex numbers having rational real and imaginary parts.
Nonetheless we continue with a ∈ Q and bracket Crat.
To count is also a form of measurement, with a natural number as the result. One
can count the number of children in the class room with infinite accuracy: there are 23
children in the class room, or 23, 000 . . ., and not 23± 1, let alone 23, 0± 0, 2. (In these
cases, the outcome still is a rational number, because N ⊂ Q; so we can stick to a ∈ Q.)
3.3 Entities
We measure the emission spectrum of Hydrogen; we measure the mass of the Earth
or of a positron; we measure the intensity of the radio-active radiation of the nu-
clear power plant in Harrisburg; we measure the acidity of the liquid in this flask;
etc. Clearly whatwemeasure, A, always pertains to something (S), and that something,
that entity, we take to be a physical system, as broadly construed as possible: it consists
of matter and fields, and is located in space-time. This makes physical systems, in
metaphysical parlance, concrete rather than abstract entities.
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3.4 Measurement Apparatus
A measurement apparatus also is a physical system, that much seems clear. We thus
need a criterion to tell us which physical systems qualify as a measurement apparatus
and which do not. We proceed stepwise, (A)–(C): in each step we consider a concept
that we shall use in characterising what a measurement apparatus is.
(A) Observability. Surely a measurement apparatus M is a physical system that we,
human beings that measure, should be able to see (or hear . . .). Otherwise M is of
no use to us! So M has to be observable by us. This raises immediately the further
question which physical systems are observable. Philosophers of science have pondered
this question. We shall not repeat the ensuing literature but mention the rather obvious
philosophical criterion for the extrinsic property of observability. Let p be a normal
person, of sound mind and having normal eye-sight.
Criterion for Observability. Physical system S is observable iff for every p: if p
were in front of S in broad daylight with open eyes, then p would see S.
Van Fraassen famously insisted that the observability of objects, events, facts, pro-
cesses, is a subject for scientific research, not for philosophical analysis. For a scientific
characterisation of observability, see Muller [2005].
If S is observable, then S seems to have properties that are observable, notably its
shape and colours. What is it that we actually see? In full generality, this is a metaphys-
ical question, which we wish to bracket. We therefore limit ourselves to a characterisa-
tion of an observation predicate, remaining neutral about whether predicates express
universals or tropes.
Criterion for anObservation Predicate. Apredicate F applied to physical system
S is an observation predicate iff for every p: if pwere in front of S in broad daylight
with open eyes, then p would judge that F(S) or judge that ¬F(S) relying only
on linguistic knowledge and on looking at S.
The addition of ‘relying only on linguistic knowledge’ is to prevent that theory, broadly
construed, is relied on in order to judge whether F(S) or that ¬F(S). Suppose around
2, 000 BC an Egyptian girl is taught that what we call ‘the sun’ is the god Raa. The other
morning the girl wakes up, looks at the sky and says: ‘A god has appeared in the sky.’
She formed this judgement by looking at the sky. But ‘being a god’ should not qualify
as an observation predicate. It doesn’t according to our Criterion, because ‘a god’ relies
on some religious theory, that informs us about gods in general and Raa in particular.
That goes above and beyond linguistic knowledge, i.e. knowledge of meaning, knowl-
edge of how to use words, the capacity to display appropriate linguistic behaviour by
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uttering words, expressions and sentences in given circumstances, and by understand-
ing words, expressions and sentences when others utter them. Person p must have
some linguistic knowledge, by the way, otherwise p could not form the judgement that
F(S) or that ¬F(S). As soon as theoretical knowledge is needed to understand what
predicate F means, F cannot be an observation predicate.7
So much for the observability of measurement apparatusM.
(B) One-one Correspondence. When we read that the pointer of an Volt-meter points
to 22 V, we ascribe the property of an electric potential difference to a circuit; when I
read 86 kg on the display of a scale while standing on it, I conclude that my body has a
mass of 86 kg; etc. So what we need is a one-one correspondence between observable
properties ofM and values of the magnitude A thatM is measuring. Or better, intervals
of values rather than values because of the finite measurement accuracy: result I =
1.04± 0.07 mA describes an observable property of an Am-meter that corresponds to
an infinite set of electric current values, namely interval [0.97, 1.11].
(C) Relevant Interaction. So a measurement apparatus M of magnitude A is an ob-
servable physical system that leads to a one-one correspondence between certain sets
of values of A and observable properties of M?
Almost right. Dupe can assign a rational number to few solid objects lying on the
table in front of him using pencil and paper: Dupe looks at an object and writes down
some arbitrary rational number. Dupe claims to have measured the masses of these
objects, because we have a one-one correspondence between observable properties of
the paper (the ink spots on it that express rational numbers) and values of the phy-
sical magnitude mass of the objects. Yet surely the pencil and paper do not qualify
as a measurement apparatus that measures mass. Pencil and paper can be used to report
measurement outcomes, but they are not themselves pieces of mass-measurement ap-
paratus. Furthermore, just writing down an arbitrary rational number with a pencil on a
piece of paper is not measuring anything. If a one-one correspondence were enough,
then measurement results would be what we want them to be, would become wholly
under our control, whereas a measurement outcome seems to be something that is en-
tirely beyond our control, something that has nothing to do with what we want. Par-
ticular measurement outcomes may be the ones we want, hope, wish, expect or fear.
But which outcomes we shall actually obtain when we measure is beyond our control
and indifferent to our needs, hopes, wishes, expectations and fears.
Perhaps we should require that the one-one correspondence must be the result of
a particular physical interaction between measured object S and measuring object M.
Dupe’s one-one correspondence was not due to an interaction between the objects on
his table and the paper. Which particular physical interaction? The physical interaction
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that occurs in explaining how M works, specifically how the one-one correspondence
between (sets of) values ofA and (observation) predicates that apply toM comes about.
Let us call that physical interaction A-relevant—which thus partly is an epistemic con-
cept.
We arrive at the following criteria.
Criterion for anA-Measurement Apparatus. Physical systemM is ameasurement
apparatus of physical magnitude A, or briefly, an A-measurement apparatus, iff
(M1) M is observable;
(M2) there is a one-one correspondence between (observation) predicates Fwhich
apply to M, and sets of values of A; and
(M3) the correspondence of (M2) is the result of the A-relevant physical interac-
tion between physical system S, to which A pertains, andM.
Criterion for a Measurement Apparatus. Physical systemM is ameasurement ap-
paratus iff there is some physical magnitude A such thatM is anA-measurement
apparatus.
The young tree in the park garden is a measurement apparatus of the dichotomic
physical magnitude ‘presence of wind’ (W): if it oscillates visibly, then W has value 1
(presence of wind), and if it remains unmoved, thenW has value 0 (absence of wind).
Conclusion: a piece of measurement apparatus need not be a technological artifact, de-
signed and constructed by human beings. Mother Nature produces pieces of measure-
ment apparatus too, unintendedly, which is why being a technological artifact for M is
not part of the criterion for a measurement apparatus.
3.5 Magnitudes
Etymologically the word ‘magnitude’ comes from the Latin magnus (big, large) and
magnitudo (measure of bigness). Here ‘measure’ means unit, which suggests that mag-
nitude is a quantified conception of some property: we speak of magnitude when we
can quantify some property and we can measure it, no matter how indirectly. Think
here of mass as quantity of matter (Newton), momentum as quantity of motion (Huy-
gens), volume as quantity of 3-dimensional space, acidity as quantity of acid in a so-
lution (Arrhenius), biomass as quantity of matter produced in carbon, hydrogen and
oxygen, electric current as quantity of electricity (Gilbert), and so forth.
A general definition of magnitude is not around. An appealing idea seems to define
a magnitude as a quantified or quantitative property. Measuring magnitudeA of physical
system S and obtaining value awould then show that S possesses a quantified property
11
that we could represent by: 〈A, a〉. But this runs afoul against standard QM, which
has taught us that measuring A definitely is not revealing a property possessed by S
before the measurement. On the contrary, property 〈A, a〉 gets ascribed to S just after a
measurement has ended and the state of S collapes to an eigenstate that belongs to a,
which then is an eigenvalue of the representing operator Â acting on the Hilbert-space
H associated with S.
Thus we take magnitude A as primitive and define a quantitative property as 〈A, a〉,
where a ∈ V(A) ⊆ R, the set of values of A, or as 〈A, a, u(A)〉 when magnitude A has
a unit. If needed, V(A) can include complex numbers, in which case V(A) ⊆ C.
A few examples (R+ contains 0):
〈mass, R+, kilogram〉 , 〈length, R+, meter〉 , 〈energy, R, joule〉 . (3)
We have now taken care of everything that is involved in the concept of measure-
ment (2). Next we present our explication of measurement.
3.6 Main Dish
Much of the labour we had to perform to arrive at an analysans of our analysandum, that
is, at a criterion for the core concept of measurement, has already been performed in
our analysis of a measurement apparatus.
Criterion for Measurement. p measures A of S by means of M and obtains a iff
(1) p is a person,
(2) A is a magnitude,
(3) S is a physical system,
(4) M is an A-measurement apparatus,
(5) a ∈ V(A) (a is a value of A),
(6) pmakes S andM physically interact A-relevantly and this A-relevant interac-
tion results in A having value a, whichM registers or displays.
Does this criterion cover all measurements that have been, are and will be per-
formed by anyone anywhere? I would be surprised if it did. For example, how about
measuring the length of the table by a tapeline? Is the result of 250 cm, the value of the
length of the table, a result of a ‘lenght-relevant physical interaction between table and
tapeline’? Their interaction consists of no more than they absorb some of each other’s
emitted electro-magnetic radiation. . . For another example, how about measuring time
by a clock? When the clock is the measurement apparatusM, what is the physical sys-
tem S? Perhaps also M: it measures the length of its worldline of spacetime, although
that presupposes the Theory of Relativity. But let’s stop, and ask what a measurement
interaction is.
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Criterion for Measurement Interaction. A physical interaction I between two
physical systems is a measurement interaction iff there is a physical magnitude
A such that at least one of the physical systems is an A-measurement apparatus
and I is an A-relevant physical interaction.
This characterisation of measurement interaction is not entirely physico-ontological
but partly empistemological, just as measurement is, due to our characterisation of
what an A-relevant interaction is (see above). This is how it ought to be, for to mea-
sure is to acquire knowledge. Measurement is also a species of knowledge acquisition.
Quantum-mechanical measurement theory provides more detailed mathematical rep-
resentations of measurement interactions.8 Back to the interpretation of QM.
4 Building supra Building pon the Banks for the Livers
by the Soangso
The Prime Directive of Physics is that numbers calculated by using a physical theory
(or model or hypothesis or principle) should coincide with numbers measured that
pertain to physical systems the theory is supposed to be about. Suppose there is a
minimal set of postulates of QM in the sense that the Prime Directive is obeyed: the
postulates are just enough to calculate measurement outcomes and their probability
measures, and these outcomes match what is being measured. Call this: minimal QM
(soon to be characterised rigorously).
When the aim of physics is
• to explain the (observed and unobserved) phenomena, or
• to understand why things happen when they happen, or
• to find out what physical reality is like, what it is made of, what there is, what
exists, what the properties and relations are of the actual beings, and how the
actual beings behave and influence each other, or
• to reveal the structure of the universe as it is in and of itself, or
• any other aim that goes above and beyond merely calculating putative measure-
ment outcomes,
then, already then, minimal QM falls short of reaching the aim of science, for instance
by telling us nothing about the fate of the cat and any other physical system that is not
measured. Minimal QM leaves too many meaningful questions about physical reality
wide open. When minimal QM is a failure, must it not be refused entrance to the body
of scientific knowledge? Is the current presence of QM in that body not a cyst which
should be surgically removed?
13
Nay nay, do not be afraid. I am not going to propose that. The presence of mini-
mal QM is wonderful, provided we extend it so as to approach the aim of physics more
closely. To provide an interpretation ofQM is, we submit, to add postulates to those of min-
imal QM so as to provide answers to questions about physical reality that we deem meaningful
and that pertain to physical systems falling within the purview of minimal QM; extending
minimal QM may very well involve changing and usually extending its sparse vocabulary.
Van Fraassen:
Ideally, belief presupposes understanding. This is true even of the mere belief
that a theory is true in certain respects only. Hence we come to the question of
interpretation: underwhat conditions is this theory true? What does it say theworld
is like? These two questions are the same.
(. . .)
Suppose we agree that there can, in logical principle, be more than one adequate
interpretation of a theory. Then it follows at once that interpretations go beyond
the theory; the theory plus interpretation is logically stronger than the theory itself.
For how could there be differences between views, all of which accept the theory,
unless they vary in what they add to it?9
There may be hermeneutical activity in the wake of extendingminimalQM in the literal
sense of the word, in that the meaning of certain expressions have to be adjusted to fit
the intended extension of mininalQM, but the core interpretational activity is to extend
mininal QM by adding postulates, which implies (salute Van Fraassen) to provide QM
with logically stronger truth-conditions (than the ones of minimal QM).
What is minimal QM precisely? Here follows an attempt to characterise it, call it
QM0. Let I(R) be a Boolean subset algebra of closed intervals of the real line.
P0. Hilbert-Space Postulate (Von Neumann). Associate someHilbert-spaceH to phy-
sical system S, and a direct-product Hilbert-space to a composite physical system with the
factor Hilbert-spaces being associated to the disjoint subsystems.
P1. Evolution Postulate (Schro¨dinger). Time is represented by the real continuum (R).
IF no measurements are performed in time-interval ∆ ∈ I(R) on physical system S,
THEN at every moment in time t ∈ ∆, associate a Hilbert-vector |ψ(t)〉 ∈ H (P0) to
S such that there is a connected Lie-group of unitary operators acting in H such that
|ψ(t)〉 = U(t)|ψ(0)〉, where |ψ(0)〉 is associated to S at time t = 0, and where U(t)
is a group member, such that U(t+ t′) = U(t)U(t′), for every t, t′ ∈ ∆.
P2. Magnitude Postulate (Von Neumann). Represent physical magnitudes of interest
by operators acting in H (P0) that have a spectral resolution. Restrict the domain of this
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resolution to I(R), so that we consider only: I(R) → P(H), ∆ 7→ PB(∆), where PB(∆)
is a projector from the Hilbert-lattice P(H) that belongs to the spectral resolution of B.
P3. Probability Postulate (Born). The probability for finding a value in interval ∆ ∈
I(R), at time t, upon measuring physical magnitude represented by operator B (P2) when
Hilbert-vector |ψ(t)〉 ∈ H is associated to S at time t (P0, P1), equals the expectation-value
of PB(∆) ∈ P(H); in Redhead-notation:
Pr
(
[B]|ψ(t)〉 ∈ ∆
)
= 〈ψ(t)|PB(∆)|ψ(t)〉 . (4)
For the sake of brevity, we have left out the Symmetrisation Postulate, which is about
composite systems of similar particles (Bose-Einstein, Fermi-Dirac statistics).
Notice that QM0 only speaks of physical systems, physical magnitudes and probability
distributions over measurement outcomes. The theory QM0 is sufficiently strong to enjoy
an extremely wide variety of confirmation. We point out that physical magnitudes can
be identified with equivalence classes of measurement procedures, so ‘physical magni-
tude’ can be eliminated from the primitive physical vocabulary (at the price of adding
‘measurement procedure’). Not a word in QM0 about physical states, physical proper-
ties and physical relations. No not one. Stricto sensu QM0 is a mathematical recipe to
calculate probability distributions over measurement outcomes. QM0 says little if any-
thing about physical reality outside the laboratory, let alone about the microphysical
world. This is unacceptable.
QM0 does not include the notorious projection postulate (for a moderately precise
statement, see below). Can QM0, then, deal with repeated measurements? If not, QM0
may be an empirical failure. An adherent of QM0
The game of physics. One group of people, the Experimenters, produce numbers
by manipulating various technical artifacts, and another group of people, the Theo-
reticians, think of mathematical recipes that also produce numbers. The aim of the
game is that those numbers should match. The Experimenters usually begin and the
Theoreticians then must match whatever the Experimenters come up with. If the The-
oreticians fail, they lose and the Experimenters win; if the Theoreticians succeed, they
win and the Experimenters lose. Sometimes the Theoreticians begin and then the Ex-
perimenters have to match. This is the game of physics, even the game of science, in a
nutshell I take it. But why do we play this game? Out of boredom? For the helluvit?
I say: No no no. We play it because we want the Theoreticians to win, because when
they win repeatedly with the same theory, that theory may be knowledge of physical
reality, may provide explanations of the phonemena that make us understand physical
reality, and gathering such knowledge is the epistemic aim of physics. Otherwise the
repeated success of the theory would be a miracle and we don’t believe in miracles.
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Standard, or orthodox quantum mechanics (OxQM) qualifies as an interpretation in
the sense above of being an extension of QM0, for it enriches the vocabulary of QM0,
strengthens some of its postulates and adds new postulates to it.
The language ofOxQM includes: physical properties and physical state. TheHilbert-
Space Postulate (P0) becomes the
 Pure State Postulate (Von Neumann). Every possible pure physical state of a physical
system is mathematically represented by a normed vector in some Hilbert-space, which we
associate with the physical system.
(The ‘pure’ alludes to a more general State Postulate encompassing also mixed states,
which are not mathematically represented byHilbert-vectors. We gloss over this.) Also
the Standard Property Postulate is added, as well as the controversial
 Projection Postulate (Dirac, VonNeumann). IF one performs a measurement of
physical magnitude B on a physical system, when it has state |ψ(t)〉 ∈ H at the moment
t ∈ R of measurement, AND one finds outcome in b ∈ ∆ ∈ I(R), with ∆ the measurement
accuracy of measuring value b ∈ ∆,
THEN immediately after the measurement outcome b ∈ ∆ has been obtained, the post-
measurement state of the physical system is represented by PB(∆)|ψ(t)〉.
The Probability Postulate (P3) entails that the probability of finding ameasurement-
outcome, whenmeasuring physical magnitude B, that does not lie in the spectrum of B
vanishes. Since it depends on one’s interpretation of probability of whether it follows
that finding a measurement-outcome that is not in the spectrum of B is impossible, an
explicit postulate is needed to exclude this. Here it comes.
 Spectrum Postulate (Schro¨dinger, VonNeumann). All and only values from the
spectrum of an operator that represents a physical magnitude are its possible measurement-
outcomes.
So much for minimal QM0 and its standard interpretation (aka orthodox quantum
mechanics: OxQM). Let us turn for a moment to a few other interpretations.
5 The Ineluctible Morality of the Intelligible
Bohr’s Copenhagen Interpretation has long been, and perhaps still is, the interpreta-
tion most physicists adhere to. It adds the following postulates to QM0, resulting in,
say, CopQM.
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 Quantum Postulate (Bohr). Every quantum phenomenon is indivisible; disconnected
considerations of its parts are inappropriate, because the interaction between object-system
and preparation and registration apparatus is not eliminable due to Planck’s constant (h >
0).
By the quantum phenomenon, Bohrmeans thewhole of the preparation apparatus, which
one uses to prepare the object-system in a particular physical state, the registration ap-
paratus one uses to measure some physical magnitude, and of course the physical
system that is being subjected to preparation and measurement, the object-system. In
classical physics one can appropriately consider parts, without mentioning other parts
or the whole. In CopQM the Quantum Postulate rules, which is however limited by the
 Buffer Postulate (Bohr). The literal description of preparation and registration appa-
ratus, and of the measurement outcomes, is given in the language of classical physics; the
Deutung of the object-systems proceeds by means of mathematical concepts.
Finally there is the
 Complementarity Postulate (Bohr). The quantum phenomenon, specifically the ex-
perimental arrangement of the pieces of measurement apparatus (preparation and regis-
tration apparatus), determines which classical concepts are applicable. There are pairs of
classical concepts, like wave/particle, kinematics/dynamics, space-time/causality, that are
never jointly applicable in a single experimental arrangement but only in mutually exclu-
sive experimental arrangements and in this way provide an exhaustive description of the
object-system. Such pairs are called complementary. They are however jointly applicable
in so far as the relevant Indeterminacy Inequality permits.
According to Bohr, the language of classical physics is indispensable for QM. Bohr
viewed this language as a refinement of Nalasweknowit: material objects in space, that
persist over time andwhose properties change over time as a result of causal processes.
The ‘classical language’ is unambiguous and accurate, so that the objectivity of QM is
guaranteed.
By classical science in general, Bohr meant scientific inquiry where the role of the sci-
entist, the subject and his thought and talk, can be ignored, thus resulting in a subject-
independent hence objective description or explanation of a part of reality that falls
within the relevant scope of scientific inquiry. Classical physics, usually by definition
the whole of physics accepted in the year 1900, qualifies as ‘classical’ in Bohr’s sense.
Classical physics is needed to guarantee the objectivity of QM.
All modal interpretations obviously qualify as interpretations of QM and are much
more modest in their extensions of the vocabulary of QM0 than Bohr cs. One modal in-
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terpretation rejects the projection postulate of QM, rejects measurement as a primitive
concept in the vocabulary, makes the Evolution Postulate (P1) hold unconditionally,
and replaces the standard property postulate with the Sufficiency Property Postulate
and the
 BiModal Property Postulate (Dieks-Vermaas). The subsystems of a composite sys-
tem have one of the quantitative properties 〈B, b〉, such that the basis of the Schmidt bi-
orthogonal decomposition of the state of the composite system is the eigenbasis of B, with
probability as in the Probability Postulate (P3).
The Everett interpretation also qualifies as an interpretation ofQM because it changes
the vocabulary of QM0 (adding the concept of a branch, or a perspective, or a world, and
deleting the concept of measurement as primitive), adds a branching postulate:
 Branching Postulate (Everett). Consider a particular basis of the Hilbert-space H,
associated with any physical system S, and expand its physical state |ψ〉 ∈ H (State Pos-
tulate) in this basis, say |φj〉 ∈ H, for j = 1, 2, . . . dim(H). Then relative to branch j, S
has physical property 〈B, bj〉, where B|φj〉 = b|φj〉.
A solution of the problem which basis to consider is nowadays sought by an ap-
peal to ‘decoherence’, which is the generic phenomenon that when a physical system
S is in a physical environment (radiation, heat bath, air), the state becomes diagonal
in some particular basis, the ‘decoherence basis’. Often this basis corresponds to the
physical magnitude energy or position, and it is this basis, ‘preferred’ so to speak by
Mother Nature, that is then considered in the Everett Postulate above, notably by Ox-
onian Everettians. They thus have physical reasons to attach ontological significance
to the terms of ψ when expanded in one basis rather than an infinitude of other bases
— perhaps even excellent physical reasons —, but that does not mean that they do
adere ontological significance to these terms, and that means that EvQM goes above
and beyond QM0, — and, of course, differs from OxQM.
Even Bohmian QuantumMechanics (BQM) qualifies. BQM adopts the Hilbert-space
of complex wave-functions on configuration space. For the sake of simplicity, we con-
sider 2 spinless particles in 3-dimensional space, having mass m1 and m2. The wave-
function of the composite system is: L2(R3)⊗ L2(R3) ≃ L2(R6).
 Bohmian State Postulate. The state of this 2-particle system is represented by: 〈ψ,Q〉,
where ψ : t 7→ ψ(t) ∈ L2(R6) (P0. Hilbert-Space Postulate) and Q : t 7→ Q(t) ∈ R6
(Position Postulate: see below.)
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Just as in QM0, ψ is postulated to obey the Schro¨dinger equation. Vector Q(t) consists
of 6 components, and can be written as 〈Q1(t),Q2(t)〉, where Q1(t), Q2(t) ∈ R
3. Vec-
tor Q1(t) represents the position of p1 at time t and similarly Q2(t). Like in classical
mechanics but unlike in OxQM, in BQM every particle always has a position. Bohmians
‘complete’ QM by addingQ to ψ.
 Position Postulate. The positions of the particles are determined by ψ via the Guiding
Equation, which is for particle 1:
m1
dQ1(t)
dt
= ℏ Im
(
∇1 ψ(q1,q2, t)
ψ(q1,q2, t)
)
q1=Q1(t)
, (5)
where∇1 is the gradient, with respect to q1, and Im(z) ∈ R is the imaginary part of z ∈ C.
Similarly for particle 2.
One should not confuse t 7→ Q1(t) with q1: the afore-mentioned describes the path
of particle 1 in 3-dimensional space, whilst the last-mentioned is a physically uninter-
preted variable of ψ.
The left-hand-side of the Guiding Equation (5) is a time-derivative of the position
of particle 1, which is the definition of its velocity:
v
ψ
1 (t) =
dQ1(t)
dt
, (6)
where the superscript ‘ψ’ is there to emphasise that the velocity is determined by ψ,
via eq. (5), which pertains to the composite system. There is further an  Equilib-
rium Postulate, which posits the Born-measure for position probabilities. From this
and an elaborate story that reduces all measurements to position measurements, the
Probability Postulate follows.
Legenda table below. All theories entail the postulates of QM0, which are therefore
omitted; only the additional postulates are mentioned. By ‘1/2’ is meant the Sufficiency
Property Postulate.  Categorical Evolution Postulate: always unitary evolution over
time, whether measurements are performed or not.
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OxQM BiModQM CopQM EvQM BQM
St. Prop. Post. + 1/2 1/2 1/2 –
Pure State Post. + + + + +
Projection Post. + – +/– – –
Spectrum Post. + + + + +
Categ. Evol. Post. + + +/– + +
Quantum Post. – – + – –
Buffer Post. – – + – –
Compl. Post. – – + – –
BiMod. Prop. Post. – + – – –
Branching Post. – – – + –
Bohm. State Post. – – – – +
Position Post. – – – – +
Equilibr. Post. – – – – +
6 True Inwardness of Reality
What we have not done is to expound yet another interpretation of QM, to defend one
or to criticise one. What we have done is something more modest. We have expounded
what it means to interpretQM and it means, in a nutshell, this: to extendQM0 by adding
postulates and enriching the vocabulary. This is achieved by proceeding as follows.
❶ List the concepts that the interpretation employs in addition to those of minimal
QM (QM0), which are: physical system, physical subsystem, physical magnitude,
probability, measurement; explain these additional concepts.
❷ Mention whether the physical concepts of QM0 change in the new interpreta-
tion, i.e. whether the meaning of the words expressing them differs in the new
interpretation when these words are already employed in QM0; explain these dif-
ferences.
❸ List the postulates that the new interpretation adds to those ofQM0; if postulates
of QM0 are not among those of the new interpretation, show that these postulates
of QM0 become theorems in the new interpretation.
❹ Mention whether some (or all) of the postulates of QM0 change in the new in-
terpretation; explain these changes.
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❺ List the questions that minimal QM0 does not answer, or the problems that QM0
does not solve, and show how the new interpretation of QM answers (some of)
them and solves (some of) them, respectively.
The above list ought to be the to-do list for every interpreter of QM.
Thus the interpretation of QM turns out to be not the same as how ‘to interpret’ is
generally interpreted in philosophy, which is: to assign meaning to. Depending on the
interpretation under consideration, there is more or less of interpretation in the last-
mentioned sense going on; but the thesis that this is all that is going on in the discourse
on the interpretation of QM is like saying that arranging the table is all that is going on
in the preparation of a dinner.
Is the interpreation of QM, then, perhaps a special case of hermeneutics as we have
come to know it in continental philosophy, where we think of the likes of Schleierma-
cher, Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer and Derrida? Is the discourse on the interpretation
of QM an hermeneutical discourse in his sense, i.e. is there such a thing as quantum
hermeneutics? Let us briefly take a closer look at hermeneutics in philosophy.
The word ‘hermeneutics’ comes from the Greek word for interpretation or transla-
tion (ερµηνευω), which derives from the name of the Greek mythological figure Her-
mes, who deciphered messages of the gods and communicated them to human mor-
tals. Aristotle introduced hermeneutics in philosophy in his De Interpretatione, by dis-
tinghuishing the symbols or signs (symbola) from the affect they have on our minds
(pathemata) as well as from the entities they represent (pragmata), of which the mental
affections are representations (homoiomata). Hermeneutics in philosophy is the study of
written texts in context, in order to understand the text better, notably to come to know
what the text expresses, to which the text provides access. The study of sacred texts
in Talmudic, Vedic, Biblical and Apostolic traditions belong to theological or religious
hermeneutics; they have one leg in mythology (Hermes) and the other one in philos-
ophy (Aristotle). The context of the text is usually taken to be the historical context in
which the text is produced (Dilthey), in order to understand the views and intentions
of the author (Schleiermacher) or to understand what the text itself expresses (Dilthey),
where ‘understanding’ has to be understood in the sense of Droysen’s verstehen rather
than erkla¨ren.10 Heidegger gave birth to existential hermeneutics, an endeavour to un-
derstand human existence, Dasein, directly, without mediation by text and language
generally. Inquiry into written text in context, call it textual hermeneutics, is something
else: indirect and further removed from life as we live and experience it. Existen-
tial hermeneutics was further developed by Heidegger’s pupil Gadamer [1960], who
further delved into individual human experience, mediated by language however, in
particular by spoken language in conversation.
21
The hermeneutic circle, an idea introduced byHeidegger, has various manifestations.
One is that in order to understand parts of a text, one needs to understand the text
as a whole, and in order to understand the whole text, one needs to understand its
parts. The process of interpretation, leading to an ever increasing understanding, thus
proceeds in a circle of reading and re-reading. One understands the postulates of QM
better after one has understood thewhole ofQM, and one understands the whole ofQM
better after one has understood the postulates. This is however not what is going on
in the discourse of the interpretation of QM. Another manifestation of the hermeneutic
circle is the reciprocity between text and context. But inquiry into the historical context
of the advent of QM, and into what the effect of the historical context on the content of
quantum-mechanical texts has been belong to the discourse of the history of QM, not to
the interpretation of QM. So this second manifestation of the hermeneutical circle also
is definitely not what is going on in the discourse of the interpretation of QM.
Derrida took a turn in textual hermeneutics by considering only other texts as the
context of a text, leading to his notorious assertion “There is nothing outside the text.”11
“There is nothing outside context”, expresses the same, Derrida later explained.12 No-
tice that we only have access to the past, to the factual historical context in which a text
is written, by means of other texts — and occasionally images and artefacts. Use of
words in other texts resonate in the text under consideration, and their use in the text
under consideration resonate back in all other texts. This seems yet another manifes-
tation of the hermeneutic circle. But, again, this hardly helps to capture what is going
on in the interpretation of QM.
Parenthetically, in Finnegans Wake Hermeneutic Circles are Everywhere (HCE).
We tentatively conclude that there is no such thing as ‘quantum hermeneutics’.13
This conclusion savours an a priori possible and perhaps promising connexion between
the discourse of (i) philosophy of physics and of (ii) hermeneutics in philosophy— and
philosophy of language we submit. Interpreting QM is not merely ‘a matter of seman-
tics’ or penetrating deeper into quantum-mechanical texts and their context. What is
at stake in the discourse of the interpretation of QM is how and what microphysical
reality is, how to understand microphysical reality — if it is understandable by us at all
—, granted that QM provides us with the best basis to answer these questions. What
is at stake here are answers to all sorts of questions concerning microphysical reality,
the world of the tiny and the brief, and to physical reality generally. Hopefully the
answers to these questions jointly provide some coherent understanding of physical
reality. Finding answers becomes a matter of finding the right additional postulates
to extend QM0, rather than just keeping the postulates fixed and re-interpreting ex-
pressions occurring in them. Novel concepts, alien to Nalasweknowit, not in use and
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nowhere expressed in other texts, may very well have to be constructed for this pur-
pose. Steps ❷, ❸ and ❹ are supposed to involve precisely radical conceptual change.
Hence in one of the most successful areas of natural science, quantum physics, an
interpretational inquiry was launched by theoretical physicists in the 1920ies; later
philosophers joined in, with a vengeance. A mainstream interpretation was settled,
of Copenhagen design. But it did not last. Copenhagen QM has left too many ques-
tions unanswered. Schro¨dinger complained that the interpretational problems of QM
were shelved, not solved. In his Nobel Lecture of 1969, Murray Gell-Mann notoriously
declared that an entire generation of physicists was brainwashed into believing that
the interpretation problems of QM were solved, by the Great Dane. To interpret QM is
to extend minimal QM0 and its vocabulary, which permits the expression of more con-
cepts than the language of QM0 permits. Since forging novel concepts is a philosophi-
cal activity par excellance, a philosopical activity is required to aid physics to achieve its
aims.
We want to unveilop the theory of the building blocks of matter and their interac-
tions. We need to destructify the obscuritads it bangcreated, in order to sunshine phy-
sical reality by a syntasm of ison and remagination. For we want to understand. We
need to understand. We shall understand. In our stream of consciousness, from swerve
of shore to bend of bay, we want to float and fly, transpicuously and persparantly, and
not to drown and die.
The final word is to B.C. van Fraassen, with an empiricist twist at the end:
Why then be interested in interpretation at all? If we are not interested in the
metaphysical question of what the world is really like, what need is there to look
into these issues?
Well, we should still be interested in the question of how the world could be the
way quantum mechanics — in its metaphysical vagueness but empirical audacity
— says it is. That is the real question of understanding. To understand a scientific
theory, we need to see how the world could be the way that the theory says it is.
An interpretation tells us that. The answer is not unique, because the question ‘How
could the world be the way the theory says it is?’ is not the sort of question to call
for a unique answer. Faith in the actual truth of a good answer, so interpreted, is
neither required by understanding, nor does it help.14
7 Patrick Colonel Suppes
Permit me to admit that it feels awkward to contribute to a Festschrift for Patrick
Colonel Suppes while not having attended the actual celebration conference at Stan-
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ford University that ook place in March 2012. Perhaps as awkward as contributing a
paper about a subject about which Patrick Suppes has been suspiciously silent in all of
his writings about QM. Does he fancy the Copenhagen Interpretation? Does he prefer
some modal interpretation? Is he an Everettian? No favourites at all? Lame agnosti-
cism? Brute rejection of the very issue of the interpretation of QM as a pseudo-issue?
Is he aware of the obscuritads that circumveilop us?
Suppes has not been entirely silent about QM. Everything he has written about QM
is about or connected to probability (available at his website of Stanford University,
spanning seven decades).15 Concerning the issue of the the interpretation of probability,
however, in and outside QM, Suppes has also been suspiciously silent about where
his sympathy lies, his insistence that the differences in interpretation of probability
ought to be characterised mathematically notwithstanding.16 Is he a Bayesian? Or a
frequentist? Does he believe in propensities?
Let this paper then be the trigger for an old wise scientific philosopher to speak, at
last, his mind on these exciting philosophical issues . . .
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Notes
1The main title of this paper is borrowed from James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake (1939, 244.15), as are the
titles of the Sections, for reasons that will become evident to the imaginative mind as we proceed; the
notation ‘244.15’ is standard and means: page 244, line 15. Any edition can be consulted, because they
all use the same pagination and lining.
2Joyce [1938], 353.22–23.
3Dummett [1991], p. 13.
4For the sake of clarity: we suppose that to observe is to measure, so by contraposition, not to mea-
sure is not to observe; to measure is not necessarily to observe. This is correct, because think of, say,
measuring the presence of a neutrino or the energy of an electron, which are unobservable entities: we
measure but cannot observe.
5Any author on QM who presents Schro¨dinger’s cat as a problem in that it is neither dead nor alive,
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tacitly assumes that it is necessary for the cat to be in a relevant eigenstate in order to be either dead or
alive. The Standard Property Postulate is also known as ‘the eigenstate-eigenvalue link’.
6See Wallace [2013] for a state of the art defence of the Everett Interpretation.
7Caveat: the distinction between linguistic knowledge and theoretical knowledge is not exactly un-
problematic, and even controversial. Similarly for the one between observation and theoretical predi-
cates. What to do when rejects these distinctions? Nothing. Read on. Simply cut away this distinction
from our analysans of measurement.
8See Suppes [2001], pp. 63–73, for some general Measurement Theory; see Bush, Lahti and Mittel-
staedt [1996] for physical measurement theory. The concept of a measurement apparatus is not analysed
but taken for granted in both books, remarkably.
9Fraassen [1991], p. 242–243. What Van Fraassen here calls “the theory” will be our minimal QM.
10Wright [1971], p. 5.
11Derrida [1967], pp. 158–159. Derrida was parenthetically heavy influenced by Finnegans Wake, see
Derrida [1984].
12Derrida [1988], p. 148.
13In the sense of hermeneutics as understood in the philosophical tradition sketched above. In an-
other, literal sense, ‘quantum hermeneutics’ just means ‘quantum interpretation’.
14Fraassen [1991], p. 337.
15Suppes [1963], [1965].
16Suppes [2001], Chapter 5.
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